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Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, Frank Carlucci

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much, Cap, Gordon. It is indeed a very great pleasure for me to be with you today, particularly this opening session. I feel it's extremely important that those of us engaged in the intelligence business have effective contact with leaders of the various communities.

Cap, let me digress for just a minute by saying to the group that I have never worked with anyone who has been more capable, more dedicated, or indeed more compassionate than Cap Weinberger, and working for Cap was the highlight of my career. In fact, as I think back about it, Cap, you only made one mistake, and that was on the basis of a recommendation from me. Do you remember sometime, I think it was about 1974, an outgoing Governor of Georgia named Carter vetoed the Headstart program run by HEW; vetoed it on the grounds that it did not correspond to the state planning commission. Well, we did not have the legislative authority to change the boundaries of the program, but we did -- the Secretary of HEW did have that authority to override the Governor's veto. Cap having come from California, the state government was always very reluctant to override the governor's veto. But Cap came to me and said, look, you've just got to convince me to override the veto. It's a good program.

Well, I went in once, twice, and it was about the third time when I finally persuaded Cap to call Governor Carter, and Governor Carter was on the move. And so we were approaching the deadline, about four hours from the time the program would go out of existence. And Cap came to me once more, and I said, Cap, dammit, this is a good program; you've got to override the veto. After all, it's a lame duck Governor and you'll never hear from him again.

[Laughter]

Well, I guess we all make mistakes. And we try to

our mistakes as small as possible.

But clearly one of the larger mistakes of our era -- and I'm sure Dave Packard can verify this -- was what happened at Pearl Harbor. And as historians look back and try to put the pieces together, it's most clear that there was enough evidence, enough intelligence to indicate that the Japanese were going to come. And in fact, the Japanese task force had orders to turn back if spotted. The combination of their ship movements, diplomatic moves, intercepted messages was clearly enough to tell us the Japanese were planning an attack. But there was no one charged with the responsibility of putting this all together and going to President Roosevelt and saying, "Hey, something is up." No one short of the President. The result was, of course, tragic. And out of that arose the creation of the OSS as the predecessor of the CIA. It had a very simple mission: pull together all the intelligence, analyze it and make sure that it's available to the public.

And that mission characterizes the CIA today: pull together all the foreign intelligence that we have gathered overseas or here in San Francisco, analyze it, evaluate it and get it before the decision-makers. We don't try to make policy in CIA, contrary to what a lot of people would have you believe. We simply try to give the policy-makers the most objective information possible on which to base their decisions.

In the early days it was fairly simple. All you had to do was worry about the Soviet Union and whatever information you could pick up around the world. And with the United States having clear strategic superiority, you can make some errors. Today, it's infinitely more complex.

Even taking the Soviet Union -- and that's still our first priority -- if you look at what is called strategic parity, which is based on mutually assured destruction -- not a very human term, but it's an accurate term. That's how we survive today. That doesn't mean that we count up the missiles the Soviets have and count up our missiles and say roughly equal, because the balance of terror is something very different than that. Sure it includes the missiles. But it includes theater capability. It includes weapons systems mix that it's very different between the two nations. It includes alliances. And most importantly, it includes intentions. And a change in any one of these factors could alter the strategic pattern. And at a time where missiles can reach us in ten minutes, it's very important that we assess carefully any given changes in any one of these factors.

Well as our technology develops, as our weapons systems

develop, our need to gather information, our intelligence community become more important. But we can't just deal in isolation with the Soviet Union. Given the complex web of relationships, economic and political, in the two countries today, we really have to have an intelligence capability that is worldwide and that is integrated. It no longer serves to just look at one country in isolation. Take a look at recent situations. The Horn of Africa. You can't analyze the Ethiopian situation without looking at what's going on internally in Somalia, what the Kenyan reaction is going to be, what the threat is to the Sudan, if that threat is going to stem down into Zaire. What about the capability of the Cubans moving from Ethiopia to Rhodesia? And what is the attitude of Mozambique? Or looking across the water from the Horn of Africa, what about the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen? What kind of threat does that pose?

I can assure you that the Saudis are very worried about it. But then you'd move to the threat that the Saudis see, both on the Horn, Iraq, and right away you're all the way up to Afghanistan and what's happening in Afghanistan. So it becomes a complex web of interrelated information gathering that has to be pieced together in very careful analysis.

There're new areas, as well, that didn't exist at the time of Pearl Harbor. A key area is nonproliferation. We have to find out what other peoples are doing in the area of nuclear proliferation. And you can bet your life they don't want to tell us. That requires intelligence. Or SALT. A SALT agreement is only as good as the capacity to monitor it, and that really takes intelligence, quite frankly, of a greater capability than we presently have.

Finally, there're -- well, even before that, there're two areas that didn't bother anyone ten or fifteen years ago, the area of narcotics, which is an international effort, possible of touching any one of our families. And the best way to stop narcotics is to know where the transfers are taking place, where the growing is taking place, to bring pressure on the appropriate governments. And that's an intelligence function.

Or terrorism. Fortunately, our country has been by and large free from terrorism in the recent past. I don't know how long that will last. But the best way to assure it does is to know when and where they're going to strike. That poses a problem. How do you get an agent into terrorist groups? If he is in a terrorist group, do you allow them to go ahead with their hit? Well, maybe not a murder. How about a bank robbery? Well, I don't know. If you pull it off, he's a dead man. But yet in this day of hypermorality, some of it retroactive, how far can we go in penetrating terrorist groups?

It's the kind of dilemma that we face every day.

But security today is much more than just a sneak attack, or even an analysis of the political positions of different countries. It also has to do with economic policy, and those of you in this room are far more familiar with that than I am. Today, we have to assess what the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany are, economic policies. Are they going to expand or not? That has a distinct bearing on our security.

Or to take something even more obvious, the energy situation, petroleum reserves. You may agree or disagree with the CIA analysis that was put out on petroleum. But I don't think you can argue with the fact that an analysis of what the petroleum needs and resources of the world will be over the next ten, fifteen years is very fundamental to our security in this connection, and indeed in connection with some of the analysis of the technical systems that are being developed in countries which might be potential adversaries.

Let me mention that the cooperation of the business community is absolutely invaluable. We have some thirty-six offices throughout the United States. They're in the phone book, listed under two names. Their purpose is to try and get pieces of information that business can provide. That information is fed back into Washington, put together. This might give us new insight into a weapons system, or give us some new insight into the petroleum situation. One can never know what a piece of raw intelligence -- what it will ultimately tell the analysts and how valuable it will ultimately be to the policy-makers. But the input that you make is very valuable. And we make every effort to protect the source of our information from the business community, just as strongly as we try to protect the lives of our agents abroad.

Just as the nature of intelligence is changing, so is the environment in which we operate. And taking advantage of the informality of this group and your desire for frankness, let me go into a couple of those issues. And I don't want to dwell on the past, the revelations, the abuses, accusations, some accurate, some not. That's history. I wish I didn't have to spend so much time on history. The fact is that we are going to have a set of controls on the intelligence community. I, for one, think that's basically healthy, providing we don't use overkill, providing we maintain intelligence.

Part of the issue is the ability to keep a secret, to maintain confidentiality. No agent anywhere in the world is going to put his life -- and many of them do -- in your hands if he thinks he's going to read about it in the newspaper or see it

come out in some congressional hearing. It's just as simple as that. And secrecy is not a new concept, like some would have you believe, in the United States. We have the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship, the doctor-patient relationship, executive and grand jury proceedings. Indeed, our friends in the newspaper business maintain, probably the best, the confidentiality of their sources. Frankly, I wish at times they would defend our right to confidentiality of our sources just as strongly as they defend the right of confidentiality of their sources. The principle is the same. In our case, quite frankly, sometimes lives are at stake.

But the central issue that we face today is to strike a balance between accountability and openness, because openness is a fundamental tenet of our society, and we have to recognize it. And how do we strike that balance between accountability and openness and protecting sources and methods and intelligence effectiveness? Those are the scales on either side.

And let me just take a minute to review with you some of the touchstones and some of the equities, as I see them.

There's a public right to know. Nobody will argue it. Indeed, one of the things that we are trying to do in the CIA today is put out more information in the form of a finished product. Last year we put out some 150 unclassified publications, ranging from assessments of the Soviet defense establishment to the world steel market, to energy, to energy development in China. We put them out through the Library of Congress, through 1300 libraries around the country. We think we ought to be doing that so that the public will have some knowledge of what our product is. And we think we can do that without revealing sensitive sources and methods.

But contrast that with the Freedom of Information approach, which gives everybody the right to, in effect, have us rummage through the files, based on any kind of request, to produce whatever information we might have on me, on you. We get requests from 13-year olds: tell me what is in the file on me, or tell me what's in the file on Israel. Those have to be treated seriously. And each such request costs us an average of \$540.00. It's a process. Last year we spent 109 man years processing these requests, two and a half million dollars. Very little classified information comes out, because we have [words unintelligible], but we spend a lot of time analyzing it. So here we have a law under which Mr. Andakhoff (?), the head of the KGB, could write us a letter and say "I want all the information you have on the KGB," and we will be required to respond in ten days. And if we respond and say "No, Mr. Andakhoff, we're not going to give you the information on the KGB," he can appeal.

We have to answer his appeal in twenty days. An absurd situation, where an Intelligence agency, designed to protect the national security, is in danger of being made the purveyor of information to the world.

Or take the balance between individual liberty and national security. I think we can all agree that we ought to do everything we can to guarantee every citizen the liberties to which they have a right under the Constitution. Nobody's arguing that point. And there're ways of doing it. And the President has put out a new executive order on intelligence which lays out what we can and cannot do; lays out a process when you want to deal with Americans, which says that if you're going to put an American under surveillance, you've got to get the permission of the Attorney General. We supported legislation that would require a warrant for domestic electronic surveillance. We have said quite categorically the CIA will not be involved in any kind of domestic activities other than collecting information on foreign countries. This is the proper way to go about it. We've accepted, indeed welcomed oversight from our congressional committees.

But yet at the same time, we have very little capacity to protect our real secrets. You know, if a Department of Agriculture employee gives out information on commodity issues, he's immediately subject to criminal penalty. There are some thirty laws in the federal government that make it a criminal offense just to give out information in that particular department -- the Department of Commerce, the IRS, a number of them. There is no such law for national security information. You can give out national security information to the public, and you can only be prosecuted successfully if we can prove intent to damage the United States.

Now, it seems to me we have things just backwards. And we face a situation where a CIA turncoat, Mr. Agee, can set up shop in DuPont Circle in Washington and issue a monthly bulletin called "Covert Action" designed to release the names of all CIA employees, all agents, and indeed incite the world to violence against the CIA. And it's not clear -- we're working with Justice now -- it's not clear if there's any statute under which this man could be prosecuted. Now if he would just give out a few commodities issues, we could get him. But we have a very difficult situation there.

On the issue of accountability, I think we can all agree that more congressional oversight is needed, presidential guidance is needed. But we're in the area today of the whistle blower, the glorification of the whistle blower. Now, Woodward and Bernstein performed a great service, that everybody should aspire to be an investigative reporter. There has to be some effort at constructing the evidence. And we had a series of

cases in the CIA of people who've left the agency, taken information they got while in the agency, written books and profited by it. And we brought one of those people, Mr. Snepp, under suit for breach of contract, because when people come in they sign a contract not to reveal information without checking with us. And by the way, that's not censorship, as press articles would have you believe. We could just tell them what we want taken out. If they don't want to take it out, we then have to go to court to get it taken out. We have no right to censor.

But what we are saying is that the individual employee should not be the judge of what is classified or unclassified, because if every employee can come into the CIA, pick up information, then make his own judgment on what could be released and published and profit thereby, this is government by take. And we might as well give up the intelligence business.

Finally, there's an issue with which Cap is as familiar as I am and Dave Packard, I'm sure, is familiar, the question of oversight versus micro-management. And I think this is a sign of our time where the Congress really does believe that it can administer the federal government from Capitol Hill. But this has rather difficult ramifications when it applies to the intelligence community.

We have, in fact, created an optical illusion. By agreement, the Congress has said, yes, we should have a covert acts capability in our government. The President has said we should have a covert action capability in our government. And that means we ought to have a capability to do something more than a diplomatic demarche and something short of sending in the Marines, that if a country wants some help, we ought to be able to supply it covertly. Or if we want to put out some information in a given country through a media contact that we have through covert channels, we ought to be able to do it.

But the fact is that to carry out any covert action under the statute, we have to have an NSC meeting, a presidential finding, and then we have to brief 140 members of Congress. Now it is axiomatic that when 140 people, as good intentioned as they might be, know something, it is no longer covert. And the other day we had a case. Somebody suggested that in a country where there had just been an election and the military seemed about to move to nullify the election, that we use one of our assets, a senior general in that country, to try and make sure that the election results were upheld.

Well, there's no way I'm going to use that asset, because if I instruct him to do that, that is automatically a covert action, and that requires that we brief 140 members

of Congress, and that general surer than hell is going to be blown.

Or to get even more absurd, and unfortunately it's true, during the Moro kidnaping, the Italian government was desperate. They were asking us for all kinds of help. And in the course of that, they said "Could you send us a psychiatrist who has some experience in terrorism?" And I said sure and asked if we had a psychiatrist. The people said yes. "Well, put him on an airplane." The General Counsel came in and said he can't go. I said why. "That's covert action. You're influencing the situation in Italy." I said "What does that mean?" "Well," he said, "It means that if you're going to put him on that airplane, you'll have to have the NSC -- a presidential finding." And by the way, the President was in Brazil at that particular time. "And you have to brief 140 members of Congress."

As a result, I called the State Department and I said "Do you have a psychiatrist?" They said yes. I said "Put him on a plane to Italy."

But that's how we've gotten ourselves so tangled up. In those cases, we think we have a capability that we really don't have.

I'm sure all of this has affected our capability. It's very hard for me to give you an honest damage assessment. We've had agents who've come to us -- I remember one case -- and said "Yeah, I knew that was going to take place in advance. But I didn't want to tell you guys, because it would have been blown." Or I've had the head of a friendly liaison service for an important country sit in my office and say "I don't think I can cooperate with you. How can I give you information that's going to go to your Congress when I don't give it to my own Congress? So I'm going to have to cut back on your information." And that information was information on terrorism. In fact, twenty-five percent of our information on terrorism comes from liaison sources.

I don't know how bad the damage is. You can never tell how much information you're not getting. But it clearly hurts us.

At the same time, I see favorable signs. I think the Congress, by and large, is becoming much more aware of the need for good intelligence, of the need to cut down on the restrictions on the intelligence community. I think our intelligence organizations, by and large, are the best in the world. I think technologically we're ahead of the Soviets. I think we certainly have better analytical capability. In fact, most of CIA consists of analysis. Most of the work we do consists

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of analysis. In fact, we have a small university in CIA. Some thirty percent of our analysts have Ph. Ds, fifty percent have advanced degrees. And they can conduct their analysis in an atmosphere of freedom and lack of constraints that certainly doesn't exist in the Kremlin where they have to perform their analysis with certain ideology. That's a great advantage. I think our people are still good. And despite the criticism, applications to CIA remain at a high level, and the people who are coming in are of excellent caliber.

Sure, the KGB has far more resources and far fewer constraints. But man for man, I think we can match our people against theirs any day.

We're receiving very strong support from President Carter, and he's taken a deep interest in intelligence. He uses it, uses it extensively. He's using it extensively right now up at Camp David. I think we've taken a strong position with the Congress and with the public, in general, on the need to protect our sources and methods, which is the heart of any intelligence operation. We enjoy I think broad support throughout the country. We enjoy, in particular, support, good support, from the business community, and it means a lot to us. And I would hope that as you continue that support and as you have contacts in circles in which you're moving, you would help us convince our fellow Americans that there is nothing insidious about an intelligence organization, that every country in the world has one, that its purpose is to defend the national interest, and that the CIA and its sister intelligence organizations consist of an awful lot of talented and dedicated professionals whose sole purpose really is to safeguard the national interest.

Thank you very much.

[Applause -- End, Side 1.]

Q: Frank, what did happen in Afghanistan....?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The answer to the latter question is the coup did take us by surprise. It looks very much like the Afghanistan Communist Party is in charge. There's been a fairly natural influx of Soviets since the coup. And I think we have to bear in mind that Afghanistan is still fundamentally a conservative country. There are very conservative religious groups. It's not going to be as easy as it seems for the ruling group to consolidate their position. And it also is not clear that the Afghanistan -- the Afghan Communist Party is totally subservient to Moscow.

Returning to the first question, we try to be alert

to these things throughout the world. We don't have a hundred percent batting average. You have to allocate your resources, limited resources, to the areas of highest priority. We had some intelligence capability in Afghanistan. It wasn't quite as great, obviously, in retrospect, as it should have been. Frankly, within the confines of the group, we're doing a damage assessment, trying to see what lessons can be learned from it and to prevent a repetition of this.

Q: Could you elaborate on your comment about maybe your lack of recourses to check on SALT compliance?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We haven't acknowledged officially that we have overhead collection techniques. So that information really shouldn't be confined to that term. But it's in the papers every day. And we've just had a rare case of a former CIA employee who sold the manual of what is known as Stage 11 in our book, Sensitive Systems, to the Soviets for three thousand dollars. And it is not at all clear that the overhead systems have the technical capability to monitor all the fine points of the Soviet's strategic capability.

[Segment unintelligible]

There are a number of techniques that could be used to make it difficult to verify compliance with a SALT agreement. All of those can be overcome, but it will require more resources into some of our technical capability. And obviously, as with any technical system, there's a certain amount of lead time. And so we have to really get busy at this point and start preparing ourselves for that overhead monitoring capability we're going to have when a SALT agreement comes about. And I think one is going to come about.

Q: Is the situation in Nicaragua of interest to you all?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Yes, we've been following it. And obviously it doesn't rank on the priority list with Lebanon or the Middle East. But all too often we tend to neglect Latin America. It's a difficult issue. The opposition to Somoza seems to be fairly well polarized to a Sandinista Marxist group. On the other hand, he was reelected. He says he's not going to step down until his term ends in 1980. There are signs that some of the more moderate opposition groups in Nicaragua are trying to get together to provide an option both to Somoza and the Sandinista group, which, in my judgment, would certainly be desirable.

But fundamentally, I would judge that we're heading for a highly unstable situation in Nicaragua.

I don't know if that answers your question.

Q: I had in mind whether the communists would gain control.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The Sandinista group is a Marxist group.

Q: Whether they will gain control.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: If they got in power, I would think that they would be a Marxist group. I'm not sure. For the moment, I don't think they have the power to topple the government. I think the government has the security forces necessary. But I said "for the moment." I'm not sure how long they will.

Q: [Question Inaudible.]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No, I think -- I think there is hope if we don't get them all locked into this state. What we need here is a lot of public understanding and hope it will be reflected in the Congress. We already find that this is happening. The Senate produced charter legislation, draft charter legislation, S-2525, which had all kinds of "Thou Shalt Nots" in the script: "You shall not poison; you shall not assassinate." And any time you try to draw up a list of things you cannot do, you get nowhere. That's no way to set up guidelines for an intelligence organization.

And they have, by and large, backed off of that approach, and considerably. They've indicated that they do not intend to go ahead with the bill until they have us on board. And so I think there is hope that we can negotiate an intelligence charter that is just that, a charter and not a detailed system of managing our organization.

That we support. We think it would be helpful to us. Some of the old-line professionals say, no, we shouldn't have any charter. We think given what we've found true, it would be better to have that stamp of endorsement.

I think in the context of developing that legislation, we might be able to even [word unintelligible] their constraints. But it's going to be hard. How do you tell a hundred of a hundred and forty congressmen who now have access to covert actions "We're not going to tell you." It's going to be very hard.

Q: At the present time, it's a crime to threaten the life of a President of the United States. It's a crime to threaten that you'll plant a bomb in an airline. But it's

not a crime for an individual or any terrorist group to threaten to put a bomb in the lobby of the Fairmont Hotel or anybody's business. Do you think there's any possibility Congress might get to that problem?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, that's really more in the area of the FBI's responsibility than ours. And, yeah, I think -- I think that after the first few bombs, they'll get to the problem, if you want my judgment, just like they're now beginning to focus on the problem of revealing names of CIA people overseas. We've had one assassination as a result. One agent was assassinated in Athens as a result of these revelations. It happened in Portugal when I was in our Embassy there. And what they do, they don't only reveal the names, but they give the address and they say "second apartment to the right," deliberately provoking violence. And that's not a crime.

So I think some of the more conservative members of Congress are beginning to focus on these kinds of issues now. And depending on how the next congressional elections go, I would hope that subsequent Congresses would take a more serious view of the national security issue.

And one of the problems is that, as a result of recent history, national security is a dirty word. Any time you say, well, it's in the interests of national security, they say "Ah, some sort of cover-up." Well, dammit, it isn't. It's your life; it's my life. The very existence of our country's at stake, and I think we've got to recognize that.

Q: Frank, how would you assess the situation in Portugal a year and and today?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I would assess it as politically stable now. There's no danger of Portugal going leftist. I think that danger was eliminated at the end of 1976.

The real question is whether they can make their democratic institutions function. And there the answer lies in their ability to bring the economy back on its feet. The communists in 1975 made a deliberate effort to break the backbone of the economy. And they did very well. And they still own today, lock, stock and barrel, the labor unions. So they're able to throw a roadblock in any government's program. They also own the large agricultural producing area southeast of Lisbon.

The Soares government essentially fell because it was not perceived to be moving as aggressively as its coalition partners, the Christian Democrats, would like to

have had it move in the agricultural area. The succeeding government, the Novella de Costa government, is essentially a caretaker government. It has no political base, other than its total dependence on the President.

My own view is that that kind of government is going to find it very difficult to deal with the tough issues that the country faces. It's going to be able to move forward in some areas. I think it will go ahead with an austerity program, but not with the vigor the country really needs to get its economy back on track.

So I am inclined to think that the political forces have to get back together again and to get a government which has a political base and move forward. If it doesn't, I would say that it's only a matter of time until they summon the military and decide that they can administer the country better than the political forces. And they would be military from the right wing. But I'd say that's a year or a year and a half away.

In the meantime I think the West has to continue to help Portugal strengthen its democratic institutions.

Q: I was going to ask you if you could tell us anything properly about the relationships of China and Russia. Are there any destabilizing factors? Is either one getting so much stronger relative to the other than there is some indication that the present tense situation might explode into something else? Or does it just look like it would continue pretty much along the same basic lines of tension?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, in terms of military capability, China, of course, can't compare with the Soviet Union. But tension is rising as a result of the Vietnam-Cambodian situations. It's quite clear that the Soviets are backing Vietnam. They've started an airlift there. They've got communications in there. The Chinese are supporting Cambodia.

The issue is less one of a border dispute than it really is "Who's going to be dominant power in Southeast Asia?" So I think the clash is a real clash in political terms. And the Chinese are really upset with the Soviet Union. And their solution, of course, is to try to get from us as much technology as they can. In fact, the latest assessment we have is that the Chinese, or the People's Republic of China is less interested in the recognition issue, although they are interested in that, than they are in gaining access to Western technology so that they can get their military capability up. But their land army would be absolutely no match for the Soviets if it came to all-out war.

So I think they would do everything they can to avoid

war, but they will certainly try to encircle the Soviet Union, politically. Hua Kuo-feng has just done that on his recent trip to Eastern Europe and Iran. They're being very active.

Q: Frank, recently I was in South Korea. And there seems to be an almost -- well, there is a conviction on the part of the people that I talked with there that if the 8th Army is removed, that the North Koreans would shortly take over South Korea.

How sensitive is that issue?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Korea is one of the most difficult areas. I confess to you that our intelligence capability in North Korea is not as good as we would like it to be, simply because it is such a closed society. And the Koreans, North Koreans around the world shun all contact with Westerners. It's a little bit like the Cubans. It's very hard to find out what's going on in Cuba.

We have obviously technical intelligence that gives us some idea when they're about to move. But they're always in a high state of readiness, the North Koreans. So your warning time would be very short. And they're practically on top of Seoul, so we would really have a hard time defending it.

I can't substantiate what you've heard -- our military people say the North Koreans have this intent. We have no hard intelligence which tells us that they have an intent. We can surmise from their military posture what they might do. But I can't confirm that.

Q: You mentioned that the Soviets have far more resources in the intelligence gathering area than we do. Could you give us some example so we could get sort of a level of comparison?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I'd say they have about three times as many intelligence officers overseas as we do. And they certainly have a hell of a lot more in this country than we have in the Soviet Union.

You've got to be wary of simplistic solutions as to that. There's a thesis in Congress. The Judiciary Committee came out with a bill, which is that we shouldn't let any more Soviet intelligence officers into this country; we refuse them visas. Well, what that really means is that the intelligence officers that you know about -- and by the time they've been in this country for a while, we're able to spot them. They leave, and they send in guys you don't know, because they can spot our

people very easily, but we can't spot their people anywhere near as easily.

The other thing it overlooked was the U. N. And if you're going to take that approach to the Soviets and want to cut down your intelligence officers here, then you've got to say we've got to shut off the U. N., because they can send as many as they want to the U. N. There're absolutely no restrictions.

So you've got to be wary. And I'm not saying you advocate any specific solution. But there's a simplistic solution being advocated on the Hill that would simply result in reprisals against us.

Q: How do we overcome diplomatic immunity? It seems that every one I read about, a Soviet agent, it seems he's involved as an aide to a diplomatic office?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: You don't.

Q: You don't. You wouldn't want it?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Uh-huh, I'm not sure I'd want it. Because, frankly, we....

[Segment Inaudible.]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The guy that doesn't get kicked out, the guy that goes to jail is not the intelligence officer, but the agent. You've got to make that distinction in terms of the trade, the trade terminology. The FBI uses the term agent to mean an FBI man. We use the term agent to mean somebody who is recruited by the intelligence agent. Our people are intelligence officers, and the people they recruit, whether it's a Soviet citizen or a Hungarian or a Romanian, he is the agent. He's the guy. He's the guy that goes to jail and sometimes gets a little worse -- shot. I can tell you in all seriousness that some of the press revelations since I've been in the CIA, which is about three (?) months now, have, we think, resulted in the death of some agents. We don't know, because the minute we see somebody's name in the press, somebody blown -- you don't have to see his name; all you have to see is some information in the press which could be attributed to him -- we cut off all contact. But in that area, we can be pretty certain he's dead.

[Applause -- end of interview and Q&A.]

CHAIR: ...Inaugural meeting was stimulating, interesting and certainly informative about national security. We thank you very, very much for coming.

Cap, we thank you for helping in this. Our next meeting will be November 2nd, the first Thursday of every other month.

Editorial

CIA Wants to Share Its File

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director Stansfield Turner gave further evidence of his agency's new and more open look when he told Detroit's Economic Club the other day that the CIA wants to share its intelligence information with the public.

"There is economic and political information that we can collect that would be of value to American businessmen," he said, and added that the CIA is prepared to expand its intelligence activities into non-military areas that might give taxpayers "a better return on their investment."

Later, in Columbus, he said the old modus operandi of keeping CIA work secret "is no longer the policy because the public wants to know. We will be speaking more, answering the media more completely and publishing more."

And in an address at Ohio State University, he said: "We hope the academic community can gain from intelligence. We need the relations with the academic community because the lifeblood of intelligence is the annual infusion of a few good, high-quality persons from the campus."

GRANTED THAT much of what Turner states may be attributed to rhetorical image-building on behalf of his embattled agency. Still, the promise to share intelligence gains with those in this country outside the military and governmental community "who might benefit from it, is constructive and overdue.

No other organization in the United States has the formidable facilities for sheer collection of information that the CIA does with its electronic devices, its high-flying planes, infrared cameras and assorted language and political experts and grey eminences.

TURNER NOTED THAT through the use of satellites there is a good deal of data available about possible oil and energy reserves, crop projections and industrial poten-

Editorials

The Dilemma of Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS, the former Director of Central Intelligence, went into federal court the other day to plead "no contest" to the charge of failing to testify "fully, completely and accurately" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1973. He had been asked about covert CIA operations in Chile, and he had told the committee that the CIA had not provided money for the use of Chilean opponents of the late Salvador Allende, president of Chile. This statement was not only incomplete and inaccurate, it was misleading and a lie.

The CIA was later found by Senator Church to have funneled more than \$8 million to help Allende's opponents, some of whom in September, 1973, brought off a coup in which he died.

This may appear to be an open and shut situation in which Helms, clearly deceptive at his committee appearance, has been let off easy by the Justice Department on a plea bargain. But the case is not that simple.

HELMS NOW SAYS that when he testified in 1973 he was "simply trying to find my way through a very difficult situation." He had sworn an oath to "preserve certain secrets from unauthorized disclosure." He felt he had to say what he said to protect his oath and serve the interests of national security.

But of course officers of the United States, whether they are in secret intelligence or not, have no right to lie under oath to congressional committees. At the same time, says the Justice Department, Helms' trial on the charge would have cost a lot and might have jeopardized national secrets; further, he had had a distinguished and outstanding career. Hence to dispose of the case by a "no contest" plea was, in Attorney General Bell's opinion, "fair and just."

The underlying problem here is that of both protecting national secrets and protecting the man whose responsibility it is to keep them. Director Helms could not be expected to carry the responsibility of secrecy on one shoulder and the responsibility to tell the truth on the other shoulder. That is asking the impossible. The dilemma should be recognized and Congress should abnegate the role of inquisitor when matters stand like that.

TO BE CERTAIN that the CIA would not intervene with American money in Chile's election, we would have had to be able to trust Richard Nixon not to order it to intervene. As it happens, we couldn't trust Nixon. It does not follow that we could not have trusted Helms.

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Editorials

CIA's Overseas Remittance Men

SOME OF THE REVELATIONS of the past few days about CIA payments to the heads of foreign states are erroneous, said the President in his press conference yesterday. And some have substance. His observations on this embarrassing expose were cautious and otherwise unrevealing.

So once again the American people are confronted with new episodes of the CIA's *realpolitik* (though probably the Germans, who invented that term, would call this particular form of CIA activity *Geltpolitik*). Certainly the CIA is gaining no points in public esteem by the disclosures of the Washington Post's Watergate reporter, Bob Woodward.

AND YET THERE MUST be something to say for a policy of financially supporting King Hussein of Jordan in our own international political interest. Since Woodward's report of this has not been denied, indeed cannot be denied, we proceed to ask ourselves what the United States got for its money, \$750,000 last year alone.

Woodward reports that the justification for 20 years of secret annual payments, distributed to Hussein, he says, by the CIA station chief in Amman, was the king's toleration of U. S. intelligence operations in the country. Another justification may be inferred from the fact that Jordan, lying alongside Israel, is no longer the host and home to the Palestinian liberation activists. If getting rid of them was Hussein's quid for our quo, who is disposed to complain about the bargain?

OF COURSE, the Intelligence Oversight Board, which called them improper in its report to President Ford, would have cut the payments off, and now Mr. Carter, alerted, has done so. But a sudden access of virtue after 20 years of secret complicity does not answer the question, how does an upstanding, democratic nation hand out payments for the beneficent behavior of foreign potentates save by secrecy through the CIA?

It seems not too cynical to suggest that funds handed out to King Hussein were not very different, in terms of what they were meant to procure, than those Marshall Plan funds of 30 years ago which in some cases went to purchase, not steel and cement, but desirable political behavior.

WE ARE BOUND TO SAY that the denials of taking CIA money which have come from some other foreign leaders, particularly Venezuela's president, carry weight with us, and we would have to see the evidence before we would believe of Venezuela what is easy to believe of, for instance, South Korea.

Spying between the superpowers

WILLIAM COLBY, who headed the CIA from 1973 to 1976, doesn't think highly of today's Soviet spies. He says they lack ideological fervor. The Russians offer "some guy \$5,000 or \$15,000 for secrets. They'll get odds and ends that way, but they won't get very much."

How true! Take the two Soviet employees of the United Nations who were arrested in New Jersey on charges of buying defense secrets from a U.S. naval officer. The data they got was worthless because the American was cooperating with the FBI. The Russians didn't know when to come in from the cold.

So we think an exchange of this pair for American businessman Francis Crawford is a good deal. Crawford was imprisoned in Moscow on obviously trumped up currency charges in retaliation for the New Jersey arrests. The three have been released in custody of their respective

ambassadors and are expected to be free soon to return home.

Spying is a tit for tat business between the two superpowers, with agreed on protocol in case of capture. Up to now, each country in recent years released the other's spies without undue publicity. This time, however, the United States, for undisclosed reasons, blew the whistle immediately on Valik Aleksandrov Enger and Rudolph Petronovich Chernyayev.

Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's edginess is understandable in light of his problems with China and Western criticism of his imperialist aspirations in Africa. But we believe the espionage arrangements between Moscow and Washington will return to the status quo without harm to detente. President Carter echoed our feelings when he said he believes Brezhnev wants peace. "We're too strong a nation to be pushed around. We want to be friends with the Soviets."

U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE

Page 100 - SAN FRANCISCO S.F. TIMES, June 23, 1977

Opinion / San Francisco Examiner

The U.S. super-snoop squabble

A POWER STRUGGLE is leading for a showdown in the nation's own vast intelligence gathering community, touched off by Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

He is proposing that all intelligence agencies be placed under the operating control of a single boss.

Supporters of the Turner proposal, including many members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, argue that it would reduce inefficiency and the duplication of effort.

Opponents of the plan, nearly all of the officials of the agencies involved, fear cutbacks and a loss of present authority.

They contend that lumping their work under the control of an "intelligence czar" would concentrate too much power in one person.

The Turner proposal for creating a new post of Director of national intelligence should be rejected.

Because that single director would be human and thus subject to inevitable errors of judgment - errors backed in this case, by extraordinary authority.

Only the president should have any kind of ultimate authority in the field of intelligence gathering, for he is the person elected by the people of the United States to be commander in chief.

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FEB 10 1977

Well suited for CIA

PRESIDENT CARTER has paid Admiral Stansfield Turner, his nominee to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the highest possible compliment for a military person. The President said that Turner "in the future could be another George Marshall."

We hope Carter's estimate is not extravagant. Marshall was a public servant of enormous stature as Army chief of staff in World War II and as secretary of defense and secretary of state.

Turner has an impressive record that at this stage indicates Senate confirmation. Directorship of the CIA is one the most demanding jobs in Washington. His performance there will give us a pointer as to whether he has the potential to fill George Marshall's shoes.

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Chuck

The editorials
are generally favorable
to the Admiral

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DDCI TRIP TO: San Francisco

DATES: 6-7 September 1978

ORGANIZATIONS(S) SPEAKING TO: Porcupine Club
CONTACT
ADDRESS
PHONE

TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY SHERRY, DCI ADMIN: ✓
MET BY AND PHONE

STATINTL

HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY SHERRY, DCI ADMIN: Baron Weinberger's residence

MEDIA PROFILE(S) FROM WHITE HOUSE

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